The following is an essay that I wrote for my 4000 level Topics in
Philosophy class: "Happiness and Suffering." I have split it up into
several pieces and will be publishing it here on Cranial Collision over
the next week or two.
Click here to read part 2.
Before I address the issues with Haybron’s concept of self-fulfillment, I do want to acknowledge the fact that his move from Aristotle’s broad nature-fulfillment to a narrower self-fulfillment was a wise one. Haybron spends the entirety of chapter 8 in his book The Pursuit of Unhappiness developing this transition, but I think there are a few critical points which he makes that can illuminate the transition for us in a few short sentences. On page 157 he writes, “. . .what counts toward my well-being must not depend on what any other individual, or group or class of individuals—actual or hypothetical—is like.” Later on 168 he adds, “The perfectionist’s fundamental mistake lies in not recognizing that well-being is what we might call a success value: it concerns the success of an organism in achieving its goals.” By perfection, Haybron is of course referring to Aristotle’s nature-fulfillment: becoming the perfect example of the human race.
Based on the above quotations, I take Haybron to be essentially saying that it seems highly unlikely that every single person could achieve happiness and well-being by striving to achieve perfection as a human being. We are all so different from each other: is there any way that every single one of us can be made happy by achieving the same thing, namely reasoning well, according to Aristotle? Haybron writes, “There is indeed something appealing about the idea that goodness in a lion consists in perfecting its nature qua lion. But is it so obvious that lion well-being consists in being a good lion, or in the exercise of liony excellence?” (174-175) He does not completely reject perfection, though. He admits that it is, in fact, necessary for the good life. He simply denies that it constitutes well-being and happiness. He concludes by saying, “But it seems more plausible to say that perfection matters, period—whether it benefits us or not” (175).
In his discussion of self-fulfillment in chapter 9, Haybron is not even claiming that fulfilling one’s emotional nature is what would really make one happy. Instead, he seems to be proposing that it would only make one happier. However, the mere fact that he is not even worried about long-term happiness in this life seems problematical.
In the case of Henry’s occupation, farming versus the train shop, it seems likely that at some point even the train shop will become dull and common place to Henry. While it might be something new and exciting at first, and it may seem like it more closely fulfills Henry’s nature, after doing the same thing day after day and year after year, it seems likely that he will get so accustomed to the routine that it could even become monotonous. Nothing can stay fresh and exciting forever, no matter how interesting and how stimulating it might be. This is the problem of boredom that Nietzsche references (however, I will leave Nietzsche and his will to power out of it) (Reginster). For some reason, Haybron seems satisfied with this short-lived version of imperfect happiness, but it does not seem logical for him to be. I think that Haybron should have pursued the topic further, that he should have dug deeper and analyzed harder.
Haybron’s concept of self-fulfillment seems accurate as discussed two paragraphs above, but his analysis of how to go about this self-fulfillment is flawed based on the reasoning directly above. Based on Aquinas’s analysis, the best way to achieve imperfect happiness in this life is linked in part to the anticipation of perfect happiness in the next life. Specifically, the achievement of somewhat long-term imperfect happiness is still dependent on God (McGill 84). As McGill writes, “Aquinas assures us [that] the gifts of the Holy Ghost that are necessary for salvation can also have the effect of increasing imperfect happiness on earth. And the beatitudes also promote perfection, and thus prepare the individual for happiness both here and hereafter” (83-84). Further down the page McGill draws on Augustine as well as Aquinas when he says:
To even more explicitly affirm the connection that Aquinas wants to forge between happiness in this world and happiness in the world to come, McGill writes, “Happiness in heaven, after all, has its beginnings in the happiness here on earth, where the soul may be drawn toward God or weighed down by the body” (89). Based on the reasoning presented by Aquinas, Augustine, and McGill, the pursuit of happiness in this world should be centered in some way around God’s ultimately-satisfying infinite nature.
However, Haybron’s move from Aristotle’s nature-fulfillment perfection to self-fulfillment is still quite valid. It naturally follows that the principle of what self-fulfillment looks like is indeed internal while the overall governing concept is objective. But how does this relate to Aquinas’s view? I believe that I found the key in one of the lines quoted above: “Aquinas assures us [that] the gifts of the Holy Ghost that are necessary for salvation can also have the effect of increasing imperfect happiness on earth” (83-84). While yes, this does relate to the anticipation of perfect happiness in the life to come based on the assurance of salvation in Jesus, I think that the application of the other spiritual gifts in this life, those not essential to salvation, would in fact increase one’s happiness based on the service, love, and adoration of an infinite God. Due to the fact that not everyone has the same spiritual gifts and that many people seem destined for a specific purpose or purposes, it seems logical that the process of discovering one’s unique spiritual gifting, understanding where to use it, and applying it to the glory and honor of an infinite God in anticipation of perfect happiness in the life to come would be the best possible way to maximize imperfect happiness in this current life. This view gives significant credence to the important distinction between perfect happiness and imperfect happiness, the move from an externalist view to an internalist view, as well as the requisite objectivity.
Click here to read part 4.
Works Cited
Grudem, Wayne. Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994. Print.
Haybron, Daniel M. The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.
Holy Bible: New Living Translation. 2nd ed. Carol Stream: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2009. Print.
McGill, V.J. The Idea of Happiness. Ed. Mortimer J. Adler. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967. Print.
Reginster, Bernard. The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006. Print.
Click here to read part 2.
Before I address the issues with Haybron’s concept of self-fulfillment, I do want to acknowledge the fact that his move from Aristotle’s broad nature-fulfillment to a narrower self-fulfillment was a wise one. Haybron spends the entirety of chapter 8 in his book The Pursuit of Unhappiness developing this transition, but I think there are a few critical points which he makes that can illuminate the transition for us in a few short sentences. On page 157 he writes, “. . .what counts toward my well-being must not depend on what any other individual, or group or class of individuals—actual or hypothetical—is like.” Later on 168 he adds, “The perfectionist’s fundamental mistake lies in not recognizing that well-being is what we might call a success value: it concerns the success of an organism in achieving its goals.” By perfection, Haybron is of course referring to Aristotle’s nature-fulfillment: becoming the perfect example of the human race.
Based on the above quotations, I take Haybron to be essentially saying that it seems highly unlikely that every single person could achieve happiness and well-being by striving to achieve perfection as a human being. We are all so different from each other: is there any way that every single one of us can be made happy by achieving the same thing, namely reasoning well, according to Aristotle? Haybron writes, “There is indeed something appealing about the idea that goodness in a lion consists in perfecting its nature qua lion. But is it so obvious that lion well-being consists in being a good lion, or in the exercise of liony excellence?” (174-175) He does not completely reject perfection, though. He admits that it is, in fact, necessary for the good life. He simply denies that it constitutes well-being and happiness. He concludes by saying, “But it seems more plausible to say that perfection matters, period—whether it benefits us or not” (175).
In his discussion of self-fulfillment in chapter 9, Haybron is not even claiming that fulfilling one’s emotional nature is what would really make one happy. Instead, he seems to be proposing that it would only make one happier. However, the mere fact that he is not even worried about long-term happiness in this life seems problematical.
In the case of Henry’s occupation, farming versus the train shop, it seems likely that at some point even the train shop will become dull and common place to Henry. While it might be something new and exciting at first, and it may seem like it more closely fulfills Henry’s nature, after doing the same thing day after day and year after year, it seems likely that he will get so accustomed to the routine that it could even become monotonous. Nothing can stay fresh and exciting forever, no matter how interesting and how stimulating it might be. This is the problem of boredom that Nietzsche references (however, I will leave Nietzsche and his will to power out of it) (Reginster). For some reason, Haybron seems satisfied with this short-lived version of imperfect happiness, but it does not seem logical for him to be. I think that Haybron should have pursued the topic further, that he should have dug deeper and analyzed harder.
Haybron’s concept of self-fulfillment seems accurate as discussed two paragraphs above, but his analysis of how to go about this self-fulfillment is flawed based on the reasoning directly above. Based on Aquinas’s analysis, the best way to achieve imperfect happiness in this life is linked in part to the anticipation of perfect happiness in the next life. Specifically, the achievement of somewhat long-term imperfect happiness is still dependent on God (McGill 84). As McGill writes, “Aquinas assures us [that] the gifts of the Holy Ghost that are necessary for salvation can also have the effect of increasing imperfect happiness on earth. And the beatitudes also promote perfection, and thus prepare the individual for happiness both here and hereafter” (83-84). Further down the page McGill draws on Augustine as well as Aquinas when he says:
"That happiness on earth is an imperfect image and a preparation for happiness in heaven is expressed in another way. Augustine repeatedly says that no happiness is possible in this life save for the hope for it in the next. Aquinas also remarks that “one is said to possess [happiness] already, when one hopes to possess it,” but he is far from maintaining that hope for future happiness, though important, is the whole of our earthly happiness." (84)
To even more explicitly affirm the connection that Aquinas wants to forge between happiness in this world and happiness in the world to come, McGill writes, “Happiness in heaven, after all, has its beginnings in the happiness here on earth, where the soul may be drawn toward God or weighed down by the body” (89). Based on the reasoning presented by Aquinas, Augustine, and McGill, the pursuit of happiness in this world should be centered in some way around God’s ultimately-satisfying infinite nature.
However, Haybron’s move from Aristotle’s nature-fulfillment perfection to self-fulfillment is still quite valid. It naturally follows that the principle of what self-fulfillment looks like is indeed internal while the overall governing concept is objective. But how does this relate to Aquinas’s view? I believe that I found the key in one of the lines quoted above: “Aquinas assures us [that] the gifts of the Holy Ghost that are necessary for salvation can also have the effect of increasing imperfect happiness on earth” (83-84). While yes, this does relate to the anticipation of perfect happiness in the life to come based on the assurance of salvation in Jesus, I think that the application of the other spiritual gifts in this life, those not essential to salvation, would in fact increase one’s happiness based on the service, love, and adoration of an infinite God. Due to the fact that not everyone has the same spiritual gifts and that many people seem destined for a specific purpose or purposes, it seems logical that the process of discovering one’s unique spiritual gifting, understanding where to use it, and applying it to the glory and honor of an infinite God in anticipation of perfect happiness in the life to come would be the best possible way to maximize imperfect happiness in this current life. This view gives significant credence to the important distinction between perfect happiness and imperfect happiness, the move from an externalist view to an internalist view, as well as the requisite objectivity.
Click here to read part 4.
Works Cited
Grudem, Wayne. Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994. Print.
Haybron, Daniel M. The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.
Holy Bible: New Living Translation. 2nd ed. Carol Stream: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2009. Print.
McGill, V.J. The Idea of Happiness. Ed. Mortimer J. Adler. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967. Print.
Reginster, Bernard. The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006. Print.
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